Comparing apples and...landmines?

Nonviolence is force. Violence is force. The questions about the two methods include:
• Can serious change happen more readily with nonviolence or violence?
• If violence can impose higher costs, why choose any other method of challenge to oppression and injustice?
• Can nonviolence impose different costs than can violence?
• What are the long term outcomes of the two methods, that is, are there any significant differences?
• Which is faster?
• Which is cheaper?
• Which method is more natural for humans?
• Which method entails more risk?
This is by no means an exhaustive list of the questions that arise when a movement considers how it will wage conflict, engage in contest, challenge injustice or solve massive social problems in a society structurally committed to ineffective practices. And no short piece can address all these questions adequately.
Briefly:
• Can serious change happen more readily with nonviolence or violence?
Joan Baez said a violent revolution is a contradiction in terms. This may or may not be an overstatement, but in a 2005 study of 67 regime changes over the previous 33 years, nonviolence had a higher success rate (Karatnycky).
• If violence can impose higher costs, why choose any other method of challenge to oppression and injustice?
The idea should be to come out further ahead with a method, not just to come out ahead of the opponent. If I gain $50 but spend $49, my gain is $1. If I gain only $10 but spend only $3, I’m further ahead. Those who do the demography of war show us wars that gained victory for one party but cost millions of lives, billions of dollars, a massively damaged environment, huge human costs of rehabilitation and care for the injured, and both individual and social psychological costs, with far lower costs on the nonviolent side (Sharp, 2005). The costs of overthrowing Milosevic were for some cell phones and bumperstickers, t-shirts and press releases.
No one even did any long prison sentences nonviolently resisting him and he was toppled.
• Can nonviolence impose different costs than can violence?
Nonviolence cannot draw blood or it no longer qualifies as nonviolence. Nonviolence can destroy an investment climate by boycotts and strikes (Sharp, 2005). Violence can destroy everything. Nonviolent force both demoralizes and converts opponents, causing loyalty shifts more surely than does violence, which usually—but not always—increases resolution and defensive commitment (Popovic, Milivojevic & Djinovic, 2006). When negotiation convinces a violent opponent that the nonviolent challenger does not intend to destroy the oppressor but will never cease in imposing costs until the oppression lifts, space can open up for a victory (Lynd & Lynd, 1995).
• What are the long term outcomes of the two methods, that is, are there any significant differences?
Real measurement of the metrics of civil liberties and human rights in the aftermath of regime change show a significant but not inevitable advantage to nonviolent methods (Karatnycky, 2005). Further, violent conflict has a longer trail of vulnerability to the resumption of hot conflict as the result of a triggering action (Darby, 2001). The overwhelming costs to women and children of most modern warfare, in which civilian casualties are higher, is enduring (Mertus, 2000).
• Which is faster?
This is highly situational and contextual (Zunes, Kurtz & Asher, 1999). It took Gandhi from 1919-1947 to free India from British rule using nonviolence. It took decades to free Guatemala from a string of military dictators and juntas. It took four days to liberate the Philippines using nonviolence in 1986. A military coup can happen in hours. There are no firm conclusions here (Sharp, 2005).
• Which is cheaper?
Nonviolence. In every case, people power is simply not capital intensive. Net victories are far less costly with nonviolence (Ackerman and Kruegler, 1994). Even preparing for violent conflict is massively expensive (Sivard, 1996).
• Which method is more natural for humans?
In some situations, violence seems quite natural for humans, and in others, nonviolence is almost intuitive. Risk assessment and collective memory about atrocities affect the conditioned responses (Gregor, 1996; Groebel & Hinde, 1989; Grossman, 1995).
• Which method entails more risk?
Risks are highly situational and are mitigated along with potential rewards. Paying others to engage in violence is only risky to an economy. Imposing costs using nonviolent methods such as boycotts or sanctions can be risk-free (Swiss Confederation, 2001). Both methods can be mortally risky.
These are not moral considerations, but all ethical and moral choices have psychological components (Teichman, 1986). If you kill my daughter as collateral damage in an otherwise just war, do you think I’ll stop feeling overwhelmingly hurt by you and eager at some level to see you suffer? If you do, you have a higher opinion of me than I do of myself. The descendents of those British defeated and evicted by Gandhi seem positively favorable toward India but still quite nervous about Germany. Some argue for mixed methods (e.g. Evans), but one might also argue that such methods expose the nonviolent actionists to more risk than the violent actors face in some cases (Weber, 1996). Indeed, in the case of the Zapatistas, it is clear that the Acteal Massacre of the nonviolent parishioners was in revenge for those nonviolent resisters refusing to repudiate the violence of the Zapatistas. Research into collective memory shows passive-aggressive behavior repeatedly in human history.

References
Ackerman, Peter and Christopher Kruegler (1994). Strategic nonviolent conflict: the dynamics of People Power in the Twentieth Century. Westport CT: Praeger Publishers.
Darby, John (2001). The effects of violence on peace processes. Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace Press.
Evans, B. Revolution without violence. Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice, 21:85–94
Gregor, T. (Ed.) (1996). A natural history of peace. Nashville TN: Vanderbilt University Press.
Groebel, Jo, and Robert A. Hinde (1989). Aggression and war: Their biological and social bases. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press.
Grossman, Lt. Col. David (1995). On killing: The psychological cost of learning to kill in war and society. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Karatnycky, A. (2005). How freedom is won: From civic resistance to durable democracy. New York: Freedom House.
Lynd, Staughton. & Lynd, Alice. (1995). Nonviolence in America: A documentary history (2nd ed.). Maryknoll NY: Orbis Books (original 1966).
Mertus, Julie A. (2000). War’s offensive on women: The humanitarian challenge in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. Bloomfield CT: Kumarian Press.
Popovic, S., Milivojevic, A., Djinovic, S. (2006). Nonviolent struggle: 50 crucial points, a strategic approach to everyday tactics. Belgrade, Serbia: Centre for Applied NonViolent Action and Strategies.
Sharp, Gene (2005). Waging nonviolent struggle: 20th century practice and 21st century potential. Boston: Extending Horizon Books.
Sivard, Ruth Leger (1996). World military and social expenditures 1996. Washington DC: World Priorities.
Swiss Confederation (2001). Targeted financial sanctions: A manual for design and implementation. Providence RI: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies.
Teichman, Jenny (1986). Pacifism and the Just War: A study in applied philosophy. New York: Basil Blackwell.
Weber, Thomas (1996). Gandhi’s Peace Army: The Shanti Sena and unarmed peacekeeping. Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press.
Zunes, S.; Kurtz, L. R.; & Asher S. B. (1999). Nonviolent social movements: A geographical perspective. Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.