Thursday, July 04, 2024

Dialog across difference #21: Who is at the table? Taking it to the international feast and famine

When we consider bargaining across cultures and even across national boundaries, what does research help us understand? What are the best negotiating methods?

University of Mississippi political scientist Lauren Ferry (2023) examined cases of creditor-borrower negotiations in which the borrower sought debt restructuring and found that borrower nations chose different modes depending on which creditor nation or nations were part of the process. 

Ferry found that more complex negotiations between multiple creditor nations led to a focus on the creditor nation or nations least likely to agree to more expansive terms. That is due to the accepted norm of consensus, meaning that the creditor nation least prepared to agree to more lenient terms was the linchpin, thus usually tending to make that nation the focus of the debtor nation's negotiating strategy.

In the end, Ferry's research into publicity about and outcomes from such restructuring processes between 1980-2009, showed that the aggregate number of creditor nations at the table is related to tactics and strategies by debtor nations. When the number needed for consensus increases, the bolder and riskier the borrower nation's coercive methods become, all with the aim of bringing the most reluctant creditor nation into some form of agreement.

These negotiations are cross cultural by definition. The findings can help us weigh best practices--can we reduce the number of parties at the table without exposing the outcome to spoiler attacks? Can we modify a default consensus expectation to mitigate a radical reaction tendency? 

While a truly transnational culture of diplomacy and negotiation practices is an ideal, bearing in mind what tendencies are proven to exist can make such complex negotiations more likely to bear fruit and less likely to feature hostile force of various sorts. 

References

Ferry, L. (2023). Getting to yes: The role of creditor coordination in debt restructuring negotiations. International Interactions, 49(1), 31–58. https://doi-org.proxy.lib.pdx.edu/10.1080/03050629.2023.2156996

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